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1 Introduction
The wealth hidden in offshore entities in tax havens has become a hotly debated topic. The
recent academic work by Zucman (2013, 2015) and the leaking of the so-called Panama
Papers have been instrumental in the increased attention the topic has received. The
Panama Papers contain information on more than 200,000 offshore entities and are in
a de-identified form in the public domain due to a leak at the Panamanian law firm
and corporate service provider Mossack Fonseca & Co. From a policy perspective, it is
important to understand why individuals and firms decide to hide their wealth in offshore
entities. Most certainly, the firms and individuals compare the expected costs and benefits
from hiding and not hiding their wealth. Many studies (reviewed below) thus focus on
tax minimization as the driver behind offshore entities.
A so far little discussed motivation is the fear of expropriation. In many countries,
individuals and firms face the risk of various forms of expropriation. Depending on the
governance in a country, different groups might be affected. In countries with good gov-
ernance, the fear is mainly with the bad guys while in countries with bad governance,
the good guys are under threat. For countries with benevolent governments and well-
functioning law enforcement, the confiscation of proceeds from and assets used in crime is
an important deterrence and enforcement tool. It is a plausible hypothesis that criminal
individuals and organizations move assets offshore when their perceived risk of expropria-
tion increases. Similarly, productive respectable citizens and companies residing in weakly
institutionalized countries with Leviathan governments or thieving politicians could rea-
sonably be expected to react by shifting assets offshore when the fear of expropriation
increases. Our study aims at understanding whether changes in the perceived risk of
expropriation and property confiscation can induce individuals and firms to incorporate
offshore entities.
We use information on the incorporation of offshore entities from the Panama Papers,
as well as information on news reports on expropriations and property confiscations from
the GDELT Project. The underlying idea is that such news reports induce private in-
dividuals and organizations to update their beliefs about the expropriation risk by the
government. Hence, for some individuals it may become optimal to incorporate an off-
shore entity and to transfer their wealth offshore. Using a sample of 160 countries and
monthly observations from 2007 to 2012, we find that the beginning of a spell of news
reports on expropriations and property confiscations in a country increases the probability
that an offshore entity is incorporated by an agent from the same country in the same
month by around three percentage points. This result is robust to the use of country-year
fixed effects, which control for all characteristics that are constant within any country and
year, and the exclusion of tax havens as countries of origin.
In the next step, we investigate whether this average effect is driven by shady fig-
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ures and organizations fleeing potential confiscation by well-intended governments, or by
respectable individuals protecting their wealth from a Leviathan government that has re-
vealed its malevolence through previous property expropriation that was featured in the
news. To address this question, we split the sample using various measures of governance
and institutional quality (and economic development), and reestimate our main specifi-
cation for the respective subsamples. We find that the positive effect of the beginning of
a spell of news reports on expropriations and property confiscations on the incorporation
of offshore entities remains large and statistically significant for (rich) countries with non-
corrupt and effective governments. These results support the notion that criminals and
criminal organizations use offshore entities to protect their illegally acquired wealth from
reasonably well-intended and well-functioning government agencies. In contrast, we find
no statistically significant effects in countries with poor governance. Hence, we provide no
evidence for the notion that honest individuals and firms use offshore entities to protect
their wealth from Leviathan governments.1
Our study is related to the extensive literature on tax evasion and, more specifically, to
contributions on tax evasion through the use of tax havens (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo,
1972, Klepper and Nagin, 1989, Slemrod, 2007, Gravelle, 2009, Hines, 2010, Davies et al.,
2018, Johannesen et al., 2018). These contributions focus, among other things, on how
tax evasion and offshore sheltering depends on the fiscal environment, including tax rates,
enforcement and legal consequences of detection. Bennedsen and Zeume (2018) show
that sometimes managers use complex nets of offshore entities to cover embezzlement of
company funds. Desai et al. (2006) and Gumpert et al. (2016) identify characteristics of
American and German firms that use offshore affiliates for tax purposes. We focus on
a different driver of demand and investigate whether the perceived risk of expropriation
and property confiscation (and changes thereof) has an impact on offshore activity.
We are not the first to make use of the Panama Papers. Alstadsæter et al. (2017a)
estimate the size and distribution of tax evasion in Sweden and document that the wealth-
iest individuals evade a much higher share of their personal taxes than the average citizen.
Alstadsæter et al. (2017b) take this approach to the global level and show that wealth
inequality is much higher than measures computed with tax data suggest. Building on
earlier work by Johannesen (2014), the studies by Caruana-Galizia and Caruana-Galizia
(2016) and Omartian (2016) use the Panama Papers to study the effectiveness of the
European Savings Directive and other policies aimed at fighting tax evasion. In a line
of research complementary to the focus on tax evasion and our focus on the risk of ex-
propriations and property confiscations, Andersen et al. (2017) and the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), which made the Panama Papers publicly
available, focus on the use of offshore entities by political leaders and public officials.2
1We discuss possible reasons for this negative result in Section 5.
2The ICIJ finds 246 offshore entities with a direct or indirect connection to political leaders or public
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This paper also relates to the literature on corporate strategy in the presence of ap-
propriation risk. Caprio et al. (2013) use data on more than 30,000 publicly traded firms
from 109 countries and find that firms located in countries with a higher threat of political
extraction have lower holdings in liquid assets and have higher investments in fixed assets.
The intuition is that cash and other liquid holdings are more susceptible to the greedy
hand of corrupt politicians compared to fixed assets. Similarly, firms conduct less direct
investment in countries with high expropriation risk (e.g., Azzimonti, 2018).
Findings from cross-country studies further suggest that in countries with more ex-
tractive or corrupt political institutions firms avoid the risk of expropriation by going
underground (Johnson et al., 1998) or having a more concentrated corporate ownership
structure (Stulz, 2005). Our study complements this literature by focusing on off-shoring
assets as another channel of avoiding the risk of expropriation.
While lawful organizations might react to the risk of being expropriated by corrupt
governments, organizations involved in illegal activity (such as drug or arms trafficking)
in many countries face the risk of confiscation of proceeds from crime and the freezing
of assets. Bowles et al. (2000, 2005) conduct an economic analysis of forfeiture laws and
conclude that they are a useful complement to other enforcement instruments. Reliable
evidence for the effect of confiscation laws is not readily available. To our knowledge, we
are the first to demonstrate that the perceived risk of confiscation of proceeds from crime
leads to an increase in offshore activity.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a simple
conceptual framework for thinking about a private individual’s decision about whether to
hide her wealth in an offshore entity. Section 3 introduces the data, and Section 4 the
empirical specification. Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 briefly concludes.
2 Decision to hide wealth offshore
In this section, we present a simple decision problem of an individual who (i) needs to
decide whether to hide her wealth offshore and (ii) may be expropriated by the govern-
ment if she decided against hiding her wealth offshore. This simple decision problem
may represent the situation of a shady individual facing a reasonably well-meaning and
well-functioning government or the situation of an honest individual facing a Leviathan
government.
For this individual i, hiding her wealth offshore is associated with transaction costs
and perhaps some opportunity costs as her wealth cannot be invested elsewhere, as well
as the risk that she may not be able to repatriate her wealth later on. We simply denote
her expected (net) benefit from hiding her wealth offshore by W oi . Similarly, we denote
officials, which corresponds to 0.1% of all the offshore entities in the Panama Papers. For more information
on their investigation, see https://panamapapers.icij.org/the_power_players/.
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by W ni her expected benefit from not hiding her wealth if the government does not ex-
propriate her. Finally, we denote by µi her belief that the government expropriates her
and confiscates her assets if she does not transfer them offshore. This individual decides
to hide her wealth offshore if and only if
W oi > (1− µi)W ni ⇔ µi >
W ni −W oi
W ni
≡ µˆi, (1)
where µˆi is an (individual-specific) threshold.
Individual i’s belief µi may differ from the true probability that the government expro-
priates her, and she may be aware of the true probability. Thus, she may use additional
information, such as a news report on expropriations and property confiscations, to up-
date her belief about the government’s type (e.g., how seriously the government enforces
the rules or how aggressively it expropriates wealthy individuals). More importantly, such
a news report may increase her belief µi that the government will expropriate her if she
does not hide her wealth offshore. If µi was below µˆi prior to the news report but is above
it thereafter, then the news report induces the individual to hide her wealth offshore.
3 Data description
We collect data from various sources to collect a balanced monthly panel for 160 countries
and the years 2007–2012. The main variables are the incorporation of offshore entities
based on the Panama Papers and news reports on expropriations and property confisca-
tions from the GDELT data.
3.1 Panama Papers and the incorporation of offshore entities
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) obtained data on around
214,000 offshore entities due to a leak at the Panamanian law firm and corporate service
provider Mossack Fonseca & Co.3 These data became known as the so-called Panama Pa-
pers. Offshore entities are companies, trusts, or funds registered in so-called tax havens,
i.e., low-tax jurisdictions. Most of the offshore entities in the Panama Papers have ju-
risdiction in the British Virgin Islands (53%) or in Panama (23%). Many others have
jurisdiction in the Bahamas (7%), the Seychelles (7%) and Niue (5%).4 The agents reg-
istering offshore entities can be natural or legal persons, and they are typically located
in a country or jurisdiction outside the offshore jurisdiction. The Panama Papers include
offshore entities registered by agents from 160 different countries and jurisdictions.
3The ICIJ provides the data at https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/pages/database. We retrieved
the data in May 2016.
4Table A.1 in the Appendix lists the jurisdictions of all offshore entities in the Panama Papers.
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The information provided by the Panama Papers includes detailed incorporation dates
for the offshore entities.5 Figure 1 reports the observed number of incorporations of
offshore entities by year.
Figure 1 around here.
There are more incorporations in the years 1996–2012 than in earlier or later years. The
highest number of incorporations are from 2005 to 2007, with around 12,000 incorporations
per year. Figure 2 shows a histogram of the number of incorporations of offshore entities
by the registering agents’ country/jurisdiction and month.
Figure 2 around here.
The distribution is highly right-skewed, with the mean number of incorporations per
country and month being 13 and the median being 4. The maximum of 551 offshore
entities was incorporated by Swiss agents in April 2005.
Our dependent variable, Offshore imy, is the binary variable indicating whether there
is at least one incorporation of an offshore entity in a specific country/jurisdiction i and
month my (with m indicating the month of the year and y the year). The use of a
binary variable avoids dealing with the highly right-skewed number of incorporations,
which include extreme outliers. In the raw data starting in 1980, the share of countries
and months with at least one incorporation of an offshore entity is 19%. For the time
period 2007–2012 used in our analysis, the corresponding share is 27%.
Table A.2 in the Appendix reports the number of months with offshore entity incor-
porations by the country/jurisdiction of the registering agents. Offshore entities are most
regularly registered by agents in Hong Kong, Jersey, Luxembourg and Panama. One pos-
sible concern is that agents from such tax havens may often register offshore entities for
clients located elsewhere. If so, the connection between news reports on expropriations
and property confiscation within a specific country and the incorporation of an offshore
entity from an agent from the same country breaks down. For example, a Luxembourgian
agent may register an entity in the British Virgin Islands for a German client. Although
the German client’s decision may have been driven by news reports in Germany, our
reliance on the agent’s country implies that we would link the incorporation of the corre-
sponding offshore unit to news reports on Luxembourg. Therefore, we drop the countries
classified as tax havens by Hines (2010) and Johannesen and Zucman (2010) in most of
our estimates. Following the definition of Hines (2010), tax havens provide low tax rates
and favorable regulatory policies to foreign investors offshore. Johannesen and Zucman
(2010) exploit that G20 countries compelled offshore countries to sign bilateral treaties
5We drop 816 offshore entities because of missing incorporation dates. We also drop the 246 offshore
entities with a direct or indirect connection to political leaders or public officials according to the ICIJ.
The list of these offshore entities is available upon request.
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providing for exchange of bank information. Table A.3 in the Appendix lists the 53 coun-
tries or jurisdictions of our sample that have been classified as tax havens by at least one
of these studies.
3.2 GDELT data and property confiscations
Our data on expropriations and property confiscations are sourced from the GDELT 1.0
Database. The GDELT Project collects daily news event information from “the world’s
broadcast, print, and web news from nearly every corner of every country in over 100
languages” (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013). News reports from other languages are translated
into English through a collaboration with Google Ideas. Each news report is fed into a
parsing algorithm that automatically extracts information about the time and location of
the event, as well as classifies it into categories and defines the actors involved.
The GDELT Project uses 20 main event classifications based on the Conflict and Me-
diation Event Observations (CAMEO) Event and Actor Codebook. For the construction
of our main explanatory variable, Confiscation imy, we use all events from the CAMEO
category “1711: Confiscate property.” These events are characterized by the verbs “[u]se
force to take control of somebody else’s property, confiscate, expropriate.” For simplicity,
we will often refer to these events as property confiscations, but one should keep in mind
that they include expropriations. For each event, GDELT defines a source and a target
actor. We exclude all events without information on the actors as well as events for which
source and target actors are from different countries.6
A major advantage of the GDELT data is the high temporal resolution, which allows
construction of monthly aggregates. The use of monthly rather than annual aggregates has
at least two advantages. First, from a theoretical perspective, news reports on property
confiscations may lead to immediate changes in beliefs and therefore, potentially to prompt
decisions to incorporate an offshore entity. Such prompt effects are easier to capture using
monthly rather than annual data. Second, from a methodological perspective, the use of
monthly aggregates allows exploitation of within-year and country variation in property
confiscations and the corresponding news reports.
One caveat of the GDELT data is that they are sourced from online news reports and
rely on automatic coding. As a result, data coverage and quality can vary over time.
There are 3,306 reported property confiscations since 2000 in the GDELT data. Figure 3
shows the annual number of reported property confiscations for the years 2000–2012.
Figure 3 around here.
6We retrieved the GDELT data in September 2016, when it included observations until the end of
2013. For most observations in 2013, GDELT did not contain any information on the event actors.
Therefore, we omit the last available year from our analysis.
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There are only around 100 reported property confiscations per year before 2007. Then,
there is a strong and steady increase from 2007 onward. The number of reported property
confiscations peaks in 2012 with 661 confiscations. There could be different reasons for
the low incidence of reported property confiscation before 2007. The main reason for this
is that GDELT was less able to detect news reports on property confiscations in these
early years than in later years, once improved algorithms were employed. Therefore, we
focus on the years from 2007 to 2012 in our subsequent analysis.7 In addition, we will
use various fixed effects to account for country- and time-specific shocks in data coverage
and quality.
Figure 4 documents the histogram of reported property confiscations by country.
Figure 4 around here.
The distribution is again right-skewed. There are no reports on property confiscations
for 27% of all the countries. The average number of reported property confiscations is
17, and the median is 4. The countries with the most reported property confiscations are
Australia (135) and the United States (694).
Many of the reported property confiscations happen in the same country and month,
or in consecutive months within the same country. Figure 5 provides information on the
number of reported property confiscations by country and month.
Figure 5 around here.
Of all the country-months with a positive number of reported property confiscations, 39%
have more than one reported property confiscation. The maximum is 27 reported property
confiscations in a single month in the United States. Relatedly, Figure 6 documents the
duration of property confiscation spells, which we define as time periods of consecutive
months with a positive number of reported property confiscations within a country.
Figure 6 around here.
27% of the reported property confiscations appear in consecutive months. For the United
States, we observe the longest property confiscation spell, with a duration of 65 months.
Overall, we observe 782 independent property confiscation spells, which corresponds to
63% of the total number of reported property confiscations.
We define Confiscation imy as the binary variable indicating the beginning of a property
confiscation spell. We set this variable to missing in months that are part of an ongoing
property confiscation spell, which started in an earlier month. Table A.2 in the Appendix
reports the number of reported property confiscation spells per country.
7We provide robustness tests using all years from 2000 to 2012 (see Table A.5 in the Appendix).
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3.3 Other data sources
To investigate effect heterogeneity, we use GDP per capita (in current USD) from the
World Development Indicators, as well as various measures of perceived corruption, gov-
ernment effectiveness and the rule of law. For each of these three dimensions of governance
and institutional quality, we use an individual measure from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGIs) by Kaufmann et al. (2011) as well as a commonly used alternative.8
We measure corruption using the WGI Control of Corruption and the Corruption Per-
ceptions Index by Transparency International (TI). To measure government effectiveness,
we use the WGI Government Effectiveness and the Quality of Government indicator by
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which may arguably capture a slightly
broader notion of government effectiveness. We also use the Rule of Law indicators by
the WGIs and Freedom House.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the two main variables for the time period 2007–
2012.9
Table 1 around here.
Panel A includes all 160 countries. In an average country and month, the probability that
a property confiscation spell starts is 7%, and the probability that at least one offshore
entity is incorporated is 27%. Panel B excludes all countries that were classified as tax
havens by Hines (2010) or Johannesen and Zucman (2010). We see that beginnings of
property confiscation spells are more common, but incorporations of offshore entities are
considerably less common in the sample of non-tax haven countries.
4 Empirical specification
Our first objective is to estimate the effect of the beginning of a property confiscation
spell on the probability that an offshore entity is incorporated in the same country in
the same month. We are concerned about reverse causality and omitted variables that
confound the relationship between the two. To account for these concerns, we estimate
the following linear probability model:
Offshore imy = αiy + β Confiscation imy + εimy. (2)
8The WGIs are based on many variables provided by different organizations that all measure percep-
tions about some aspect of governance or institutional quality. The individual WGIs are then constructed
using an unobserved component model.
9Table A.4 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics for the longer sample from 2000 to 2012.
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Subscripts i, m, and y indicate the country, the month and the calendar year, respectively.
The parameter of main interest is β. We exploit within-country and -year variation to
identify this parameter. The country-year dummies αiy control, in the most flexible way,
for all confounders that are constant within a calendar year and country. This includes all
country-level variables that are available on a yearly granularity, such as measures of GDP,
population, institutional quality, governance, tax revenues, etc. In other specifications, we
further include month dummies γm to control for seasonal effects and the lagged dependent
variable to account for unobserved within-year and -country variation. The error term εimy
absorbs unexplained variations in offshore entity incorporations. We cluster the standard
errors of the estimated coefficients at the country level.
The specification above looks to identify a contemporaneous effect. In other words,
our conjecture is that news reports on confiscations and expropriations lead to the in-
corporation of offshore companies within the same month. The rationale for this is the
ease and speed with which offshore companies can be incorporated. Many agents provide
their services publicly on the Internet. The process of advising an agent to set up an
offshore company takes about ten minutes. Within a couple of days, the agent prepares
the documents and registers the incorporation.
While the fixed effects and lagged-dependent variables control for unobserved hetero-
geneity, reverse causality could still be a concern. One could think of a scenario where
an individual or an organization incorporates an offshore entity, which then leads to a
government expropriating assets at home to either remedy the tax avoidance and evasion
committed by this act or in the case of a “bad” government to expropriate assets not
moved yet. Our specification exploits the different time frames for the incorporation of an
offshore entity and the expropriation of assets. For reverse causality to cause our results,
confiscation or expropriation would need to be reported on in the same month as the
incorporation that reversely caused the confiscation or expropriation.
Confiscation processes typically take a long time. First, the incorporation has to
be detected and confirmed. This typically, if it happens at all, takes some time, well
beyond a month, as the incorporation of an offshore entity and the person behind it, are
not observed by enforcement agencies. One major attraction of registering a company
offshore is secrecy. The two main target countries identified in the Panama Papers, the
British Virgin Islands and Panama itself, are in the top 20 of the current Financial Secrecy
Index (Tax Justice Network, 2018, Cobham et al., 2015) with strict privacy laws.10 For a
government to detect the relation of an entity and a local person or firm controlling it, in
most cases a leak is required. For the period under investigation, there were no systematic
large-scale leaks (such as the leaking of the Panama Papers). Moreover, just finding out
10Both destinations allow the use of so-called bearer shares. The physical holder of the bearer shares
controls the company, without the owner’s name being recorded in a shareholder register or anywhere
else.
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about the incorporation in the same month is not enough for potential reverse causality.
The actual confiscation or expropriation process has to be at least so far evolved in the
same month that it is featured in the news. Typically, a lengthy legal process is necessary
before confiscation or expropriation occurs.11 Thus, our specification practically rules out
reverse causality.
Our second objective is to investigate effect heterogeneity. The key question is whether
the beginning of reports on property confiscations mainly leads to the incorporation of
offshore entities in countries with relatively honest and effective governments or in coun-
tries with weak governance. In the former case, β > 0 is consistent with the notion that
shady figures use offshore entities to protect illegally acquired wealth from reasonably
well-intended and well-functioning government agencies that have become more serious
about enforcing the rules. In the latter case, β > 0 is consistent with the notion that
even honest individuals use offshore entities to protect their wealth from a Leviathan
government that expropriates successful firms and individuals. To address this question,
we split the sample along various measures of governance (and economic development)
before estimating equation (2) for the respective subsamples.
5 Empirical findings
5.1 Main results
Table 2 documents our main estimation results.
Table 2 around here.
Panel A uses all observations from the sample period 2007–2012. In column (1), we report
the results of a binary ordinary least squares regression. We find a positive correlation
between the beginning of a property confiscation spell and the probability of the incor-
poration of an offshore entity. However, this correlation is not statistically significant.
We sequentially increase the complexity of the model. In column (2), we include year
and country fixed effects. In column (3), we include country-year fixed effects to estimate
specification 2. This enables us to account for unobserved variables that are constant
within a calendar year but may vary across calendar years within countries (such as
measures for macroeconomic and political developments). The estimated coefficients are
positive and statistically significant in these two columns, and very similar in magnitude.
They suggest that the beginning of a property confiscation spell increases the probability
of the incorporation of an offshore entity by 3 percentage points.
11See, e.g., U.S. Department of State (2018), Transparency International (2015) and Bartels (2010) for
descriptions of the process in the United States, the European Union and Australia, respectively.
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We then add month-fixed effects in column (4) and the lagged dependent variable as a
control in column (5). The estimated coefficient drops by around half a percentage point
but is still statistically significant at the 5% level in the most demanding specification
reported in column (5).
In Panels B, C and D of Table 2, we report the estimation results we drop countries
classified as tax havens by Hines (2010), Johannesen and Zucman (2010) or either of the
two studies, respectively. Although the simple binary estimates in column (1) are quite
strongly affected by the omission of tax havens, the estimates in all the other columns
remain very similar. This pattern suggests that our identification strategy can account
for a large amount of between-country and between-year unobserved heterogeneity. More
importantly, these results show that the positive effect of the beginning of news reports
on property confiscations on the incorporation of offshore entities is not driven by the
(mostly small) tax havens.
Table A.5 in the Appendix reports the estimation results for the time period 2000–
2012. The results are qualitatively similar, but the size of the effects is somewhat smaller.
5.2 Effect heterogeneity
We now look at heterogeneous effects and start by splitting the sample of countries that
have not been classified as tax havens depending on whether their GDP per capita was
above or below the median in 2006 (i.e., before our sample period). The results are
reported in Table 3.
Table 3 around here.
The coefficient estimates in columns (2)–(5) suggest that the beginning of a property
confiscation spell increases the probability of the incorporation of an offshore entity by
around four percentage points in relatively rich countries but by only around one per-
centage point in relatively poor countries. Most of the estimates for the relatively rich
countries are statistically significant, while the estimates for the relatively poor countries
are not statistically significant.
We now turn to the question whether the beginning of news reports on property con-
fiscations mainly leads to the incorporation of offshore entities in countries with good
governance and sound institutions or in weakly institutionalized countries. For that pur-
pose, we split the sample of non-tax haven countries depending on whether their level of
perceived corruption was above or below the median in 2006. We do so in Table 4 using
the WGI Control of Corruption in panels A and B, and the TI Corruption Perceptions
Index in panels C and D.
Table 4 around here.
The coefficient estimates in columns (2)–(5) suggest that the beginning of a property
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confiscation spell increases the probability of the incorporation of an offshore entity by
three to six percentage points in the countries with relatively low levels of corruption
(panels A and C). These estimates are mostly not statistically significant when using the
WGI Control of Corruption to split the sample but are statistically significant when using
TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index. The effects are much smaller in magnitude and not
statistically significant for the relatively corrupt countries (panels B and D).
In Table 5, we split the sample depending on how effective the governments are us-
ing the WGI Government Effectiveness in panels A and B, and the ICRG’s Quality of
Government Indicator in panels C and D.
Table 5 around here.
The coefficient estimates in columns (2)–(5) suggest that the beginning of a property
confiscation spell leads to a statistically significant increase in the probability of the
incorporation of an offshore entity by five to seven percentage points in countries with
relatively effective governments (panels A and C). There are no statistically significant
effects in countries with relatively ineffective governments.
Finally, in Table 6, we split the sample depending on the rule of law using the WGI
Rule of Law in panels A and B, and the by Freedom House (FH) Rule of Law measure in
panels C and D.
Table 6 around here.
The sample split based on the WGI suggests a large and statistically significant effect
for countries with relatively strong rule of law but no statistically significant effect for
countries with relatively weak rule of law. The sample split based on the FH measure
results in a considerably smaller difference across the two sub-samples.
The pattern emerging from Tables 4–6 is consistent with the notion that shady figures
use offshore entities to protect illegally acquired wealth from relatively well-intended and
well-functioning governments that have become more serious about enforcing the rules.
However, our results provide no evidence for the notion that individuals use offshore
entities to protect their wealth from Leviathan governments that start expropriating firms
and individuals more aggressively. This absence of evidence suggests that either this latter
use of offshore entities is rare, or that our data and our approach fail to capture it. There
are reasons to believe that the latter could be the case. For example, the GDELT Project
might be less successful in extracting information from the relevant news sources in the
(mostly developing) countries with Leviathan governments. Moreover, in some countries,
the belief that the government is Leviathan and likely to extort successful individuals who
are not part of its inner circle may already be close to one. In response to news reports
on expropriations or property confiscations, these individuals would neither update their
beliefs nor change their course of action. In addition, individuals from these countries
13
may rely on agents located in tax havens rather than their own country to incorporate
offshore entities.
6 Conclusions
We have argued that news reports on expropriations and property confiscations may
increase the beliefs of some private individuals and firms that the government will ex-
propriate them and confiscate their assets unless they hide them in an offshore entity.
Using the Panama Papers, we have shown that the beginning of media reporting on ex-
propriations and property confiscations in a country indeed increases the probability that
offshore entities are incorporated by agents from the same country in the same month.
We have documented that this effect is mainly driven by countries with relatively hon-
est and effective governments. These findings suggest that offshore entities are used to
hide wealth as honest and effective governments become more serious about enforcing the
rules.
The policy debate on how to deal with tax havens has been strongly influenced by
the large literature showing that individuals and firms hide wealth in offshore entities
to evade (and avoid) taxes. The focus on tax evasion (and avoidance) makes sense on
many grounds. Nevertheless, policy makers should not neglect that offshore entities are
also used to hide wealth from honest and effective governments that become more serious
about law enforcement.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Number of offshore entity incorporations by year.
Note: Own calculations based on data from the Panama Papers.
Figure 2: Histogram of the number of offshore entity incorporations by country and
month.
Note: Own calculations based on data from the Panama Papers. We include only countries and months
with a positive number of offshore entity incorporations.
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Figure 3: Number of reported property confiscations by year.
Note: Own calculations based on data from GDELT from the years 2000-2012.
Figure 4: Histogram of the number of reported property confiscations by country.
Note: Own calculations based on data from GDELT from the years 2007-2012.
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Figure 5: Histogram of the number of reported property confiscations by country and
month.
Note: Own calculations based on data from GDELT from the years 2007-2012. We include only countries
and months with a positive number of reported property confiscations.
Figure 6: Histogram of the duration of property confiscating spells.
Note: Own calculations based on data from GDELT from the years 2007-2012.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 2007-2012.
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: Full sample
Offshore imy 11,063 0.2662 0.4420 0 1
Confiscation imy 11,063 0.0707 0.2563 0 1
Panel B: Tax havens dropped
Offshore imy 7,268 0.1878 0.3906 0 1
Confiscation imy 7,268 0.0951 0.2933 0 1
Note: Time period is 2007–2012. Panel B excludes countries classified as tax havens by Hines (2010) or
Johannesen and Zucman (2014; see Table A.3 in the Appendix for details). Confiscationimy is a binary
variable indicating the beginning of a spell of months with news reports on expropriations and property
confiscations in country i; and Offshoreimy is a binary variable indicating the incorporation of at least
one offshore entity by agents from country i (see Section 3 for details).
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Table 2: Main results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Full sample
Confiscation imy 0.047 0.028** 0.030** 0.023* 0.024**
(0.036) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 11,063 11,063 11,063 11,063 11,063
Panel B: Hines’ tax havens dropped
Confiscation imy 0.109*** 0.027** 0.029** 0.022* 0.024*
(0.035) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 7,910 7,910 7,910 7,910 7,910
Panel C: Johannesen and Zucman’s tax havens dropped
Confiscation imy 0.112*** 0.033** 0.034** 0.027** 0.029**
(0.034) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 7,625 7,625 7,625 7,625 7,625
Panel D: All tax havens dropped
Confiscation imy 0.116*** 0.029** 0.030** 0.024* 0.026**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.020)
Observations 7,268 7,268 7,268 7,268 7,268
Country-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Year-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Country-year-fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Month-fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Lagged dependent variable No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is Offshoreimy. Time period is 2007–2012. Panels B, C and D exclude coun-
tries classified as tax havens by Hines (2010), Johannesen and Zucman (2014) or any of the two studies,
respectively (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for country lists). Confiscationimy is a binary variable indi-
cating the beginning of a spell of months with news reports on expropriations and property confiscations
in country i; and Offshoreimy is a binary variable indicating the incorporation of at least one offshore
entity by agents from country i (see Section 3 for details). Standard errors are clustered at the country
level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 3: Estimation results for rich and poor countries.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: GDP per capita above median
Confiscation imy 0.167*** 0.044* 0.046** 0.035 0.037*
(0.042) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 3,503 3,503 3,503 3,503 3,503
Panel B: GDP per capita below median
Confiscation imy 0.050 0.013 0.011 0.007 0.008
(0.052) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 3,550 3,550 3,550 3,550 3,550
Country-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Year-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Country-year-fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Month-fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Lagged dependent variable No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is Offshoreimy. Time period is 2007–2012. Countries classified as tax havens by
Hines (2010) or Johannesen and Zucman (2014) are excluded (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for country
lists). The sample split is based on 2006 values for GDP per capita (in current US-Dollars) from the
World Development Indicators. Confiscationimy is a binary variable indicating the beginning of a spell of
months with news reports on expropriations and property confiscations in country i; and Offshoreimy is
a binary variable indicating the incorporation of at least one offshore entity by agents from country i (see
Section 3 for details). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance
at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 4: Estimation results for countries with low and high levels of corruption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Less corruption than the median according to WGI
Confiscation imy 0.149*** 0.041* 0.043* 0.033 0.035
(0.040) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 3,538 3,538 3,538 3,538 3,538
Panel B: More corruption than the median according to WGI
Confiscation imy 0.072 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.015
(0.053) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 3,514 3,514 3,514 3,514 3,514
Panel C: Less corruption than the median according to TI
Confiscation imy 0.157*** 0.054** 0.056*** 0.040** 0.042**
(0.043) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Observations 3,598 3,598 3,598 3,598 3,598
Panel D: More corruption than the median according to TI
Confiscation imy 0.023 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.042) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 3,310 3,310 3,310 3,310 3,310
Country-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Year-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Country-year-fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Month-fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Lagged dependent variable No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is Offshoreimy. Time period is 2007–2012. Countries classified as tax havens by
Hines (2010) or Johannesen and Zucman (2014) are excluded (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for country
lists). The sample split is based on 2006 values for the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) Control
of Corruption in Panels A and B, and the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International
(TI) in Panels C and D. Confiscationimy is a binary variable indicating the beginning of a spell of months
with news reports on expropriations and property confiscations in country i; and Offshoreimy is a binary
variable indicating the incorporation of at least one offshore entity by agents from country i (see Section
3 for details). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the
1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 5: Estimation results for countries with low and high government effectiveness.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: More effective government than the median according to WGI
Confiscation imy 0.177*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.052** 0.053**
(0.047) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 3,443 3,443 3,443 3,443 3,443
Panel B: Less effective government than the median according to WGI
Confiscation imy 0.029 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010
(0.040) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 33,609 3,609 3,609 3,609 3,609
Panel C: More effective government than the median according to ICRG
Confiscation imy 0.148*** 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.047** 0.049**
(0.045) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 3,301 3,301 3,301 3,301 3,301
Panel D: Less effective government than the median according to ICRG
Confiscation imy 0.036 -0.013 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007
(0.048) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 3,248 3,248 3,248 3,248 3,248
Country-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Year-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Country-year-fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Month-fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Lagged dependent variable No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is Offshoreimy. Time period is 2007–2012. Countries classified as tax havens
by Hines (2010) or Johannesen and Zucman (2014) are excluded (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for
country lists). The sample split is based on 2006 values for the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI)
Government Effectiveness in Panels A and B, and the Quality of Government indicator by the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide (ICRG) in Panels C and D. Confiscationimy is a binary variable indicating
the beginning of a spell of months with news reports on expropriations and property confiscations in
country i; and Offshoreimy is a binary variable indicating the incorporation of at least one offshore entity
by agents from country i (see Section 3 for details). Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 6: Estimation results for countries with strong and weak rule of law.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Stronger rule of law than the median according to WGI
Confiscation imy 0.155*** 0.050** 0.050** 0.036* 0.038*
(0.043) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 3,492 3,492 3,492 3,492 3,492
Panel B: Weaker rule of law than the median according to WGI
Confiscation imy 0.063 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.012
(0.052) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 3,560 3,560 3,560 3,560 3,560
Panel C: Stronger rule of law than the median according to FH
Confiscation imy 0.112*** 0.038* 0.037* 0.025 0.026
(0.038) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 3,906 3,906 3,906 3,906 3,906
Panel D: Weaker rule of law than the median according to FH
Confiscation imy 0.108* 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.023
(0.059) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 3,146 3,146 3,146 3,146 3,146
Country-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Year-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Country-year-fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Month-fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Lagged dependent variable No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is Offshoreimy. Time period is 2007–2012. Countries classified as tax havens
by Hines (2010) or Johannesen and Zucman (2014) are excluded (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for
country lists). The sample split is based on 2006 values for the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI)
Rule of Law in Panels A and B, and the Rule of Law indicator by Freedom House (FH) in Panels C and
D. Offshoreimy and Confiscationimy is a binary variable indicating the beginning of a spell of months
with news reports on expropriations and property confiscations in country i; and Offshoreimy is a binary
variable indicating the incorporation of at least one offshore entity by agents from country i (see Section
3 for details). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the
1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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Appendix: Additional tables
Table A.1: Jurisdictions of offshore entities in the Panama Papers.
Jurisdiction Absolute Relative Cumulatedfrequency frequency frequency
Virgin Islands, British 112,915 53.12% 53.12%
Panama 48,214 22.68% 75.80%
Bahamas 15,870 7.466% 83.27%
Seychelles 15,133 7.119% 90.39%
Niue 9,567 4.501% 94.89%
Samoa 5,292 2.490% 97.38%
Anguilla 3,232 1.520% 98.90%
Nevada 1,255 0.590% 99.49%
Hong Kong 452 0.213% 99.70%
United Kingdom 145 0.068% 99.77%
Belize 130 0.061% 99.83%
Costa Rica 78 0.037% 99.87%
Cyprus 76 0.036% 99.90%
Uruguay 52 0.024% 99.93%
New Zealand 47 0.022% 99.95%
Jersey 39 0.018% 99.97%
Wyoming 37 0.017% 99.98%
Malta 28 0.013% 100.00%
Isle of Man 7 0.003% 100.00%
Ras al Khaimah 2 0.001% 100.00%
Singapore 1 0.0005% 100.00%
Total 212,572 100%
Note: Own calculations based on data from the Panama Papers.
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Table A.2: Countries/jurisdictions of agents’ registering offshore entities.
Agents’ Months with Property Agents’ Months with Property
country/ offshore entity confiscation country/ offshore entity confiscation
jurisdiction incorporations spells jurisdiction incorporations spells
Albania 0 1 Ecuador 60 4
Am. Samoa 1 0 Egypt 3 10
Andorra 35 0 El Salvador 42 1
Angola 7 0 Estonia 51 2
Anguilla 14 0 Finland 9 2
Antigua & Barb. 8 2 France 20 6
Argentina 36 3 Georgia 0 0
Aruba 10 0 Germany 18 16
Australia 6 13 Ghana 1 8
Austria 2 5 Gibraltar 60 0
Azerbaijan 2 3 Greece 25 9
Bahamas 61 1 Guam 0 0
Bahrain 0 4 Guatemala 57 2
Bangladesh 2 13 Guernsey 60 0
Barbados 8 1 Haiti 1 3
Belarus 4 5 Honduras 5 5
Belgium 6 0 Hong Kong 64 0
Belize 51 0 Hungary 8 7
Bermuda 1 2 Iceland 2 3
Bolivia 32 3 India 6 17
Botswana 0 1 Indonesia 3 15
Brazil 57 5 Iran 0 19
Brunei Darus. 1 0 Ireland 16 11
Bulgaria 7 6 Isle of Man 61 0
Cameroon 2 0 Israel 37 17
Canada 27 16 Italy 28 16
Cayman Islands 17 1 Jamaica 0 5
Centr. Afr. Rep. 1 1 Japan 5 10
Chad 3 0 Jersey 63 0
Chile 25 2 Jordan 60 7
China 46 18 Kazakhstan 0 2
Colombia 56 13 Kenya 4 10
Cook Islands 0 0 Korea 2 11
Costa Rica 55 2 Kuwait 7 3
Croatia 2 1 Latvia 44 1
Cuba 1 7 Lebanon 51 9
Curaçao 6 0 Lesotho 0 0
Cyprus 59 3 Liberia 0 7
Czech Republic 10 8 Libya 0 9
Côte d’Ivoire 4 1 Liechtenst. 60 0
Denmark 2 0 Lithuania 4 4
Djibouti 1 0 Luxemb. 62 1
Dominica 24 0 Macao 6 0
Dominican Rep. 50 6 Macedonia 0 2
< table continues on next page >
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Table A.2: < continued >
Agents’ Months with Property Agents’ Months with Property
country/ offshore entity confiscation country/ offshore entity confiscation
jurisdiction incorporations spells jurisdiction incorporations spells
Malawi 0 1 Saudi Arabia 13 12
Malaysia 3 12 Senegal 0 1
Mali 0 1 Seychelles 60 1
Malta 54 2 Singapore 61 5
Marshall Is. 0 0 Sint Maarten 0 0
Mauritius 59 0 Slovakia 0 3
Mexico 14 15 Slovenia 4 0
Moldova 0 0 South Africa 12 5
Monaco 60 1 Spain 46 12
Montenegro 5 0 Sri Lanka 0 6
Morocco 13 3 Sudan 0 13
Mozambique 0 1 Sweden 2 3
Namibia 1 2 Switzerland 59 8
Nauru 1 0 Syria 0 8
Netherlands 18 6 Taiwan 50 7
New Zealand 7 9 Tanzania 0 5
Nicaragua 1 3 Thailand 46 12
Nigeria 2 16 Trin. & Tob. 1 2
Niue 0 0 Tunisia 0 10
Norway 0 5 Turkey 11 14
Oman 2 1 Turks & C. Is. 2 0
Pakistan 0 13 Uganda 0 11
Panama 62 2 Ukraine 43 9
Paraguay 19 2 Un. Arab Em. 62 11
Peru 12 3 Ukraine 43 18
Philippines 2 12 US 5 3
Poland 13 7 Uruguay 61 0
Portugal 16 2 Uzbekistan 2 5
Puerto Rico 0 0 Vanuatu 0 0
Qatar 4 1 Venezuela 53 13
Romania 1 10 Vietnam 2 5
Russian Fed. 40 16 Virgin Is., Br. 58 0
St. Kitts & N. 31 0 Virgin Is., US 1 0
St. Lucia 0 0 Yemen 0 10
St. Vinc. & G. 1 0 Zambia 0 11
Samoa 60 0 Zimbabwe 0 12
Note: Own calculations based on Panama Papers and GDELT data for the years 2007-2012.
29
Table A.3: List of countries/jurisdictions classified as tax havens.
Country/jurisdiction Hines Johannesen and(2010) Zucman (2010)
Andorra x x
Anguilla x x
Antigua and Barbuda x x
Aruba x x
Austria x
Bahamas x x
Bahrain x x
Barbados x x
Belgium x
Belize x x
Bermuda x x
Cayman Islands x x
Chile x
Cook Islands x x
Costa Rica x x
Curacao x
Cyprus x x
Djibouti x
Dominica x x
Gibraltar x x
Guernsey x x
Hong Kong x x
Ireland x
Isle of Man x x
Jersey x x
Jordan x
Lebanon x
Liberia x x
Liechtenstein x x
Luxembourg x x
Macao x x
Malaysia x
Malta x x
Marshall Islands x x
Mauritius x
Monaco x x
Nauru x x
Niue x x
Panama x x
Saint Kitts and Nevis x x
Saint Lucia x x
Saint Vincent and the G. x x
Samoa x x
Seychelles x x
Singapore x x
Sint Maarten x
Switzerland x x
Trinidad and Tobago x
Turks and Caicos Islands x x
Uruguay x
Vanuatu x x
Virgin Islands, British x x
Virgin Islands, U.S. x
Note: This list is based on Table A.1 in Kolstad and
Wiig (2015).
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics for time period 2000–2012.
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: Full sample
Offshore imy 24,406 0.2655 0.4416 0 1
Confiscation imy 24,406 0.0497 0.2172 0 1
Panel B: Tax havens dropped
Offshore imy 16,161 0.1880 0.3907 0 1
Confiscation imy 16,161 0.0674 0.2507 0 1
Note: Time period is 2000–2012. Panel B excludes countries classified as tax havens by Hines (2010) or
Johannesen and Zucman (2014; see Table A.3 in the Appendix for details). Confiscationimy is a binary
variable indicating the beginning of a spell of months with news reports on expropriations and property
confiscations in country i; and Offshoreimy is a binary variable indicating the incorporation of at least
one offshore entity by agents from country i (see Section 3 for details).
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Table A.5: Estimation results for the time period 2000–2012.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Full sample
Confiscation imy 0.048 0.019** 0.017* 0.014 0.015*
(0.036) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 24,406 24,406 24,406 24,406 24,406
Panel B: Hines’ tax havens dropped
Confiscation imy 0.109*** 0.021** 0.018* 0.015 0.016*
(0.034) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 17,559 17,559 17,559 17,559 17,559
Panel C: Johannesen and Zucman’s tax havens dropped
Confiscation imy 0.107*** 0.023** 0.022** 0.018** 0.019**
(0.033) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 16,938 16,938 16,938 16,938 16,938
Panel D: All tax havens dropped
Confiscation imy 0.114*** 0.022** 0.019* 0.016* 0.017*
(0.034) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 16,161 16,161 16,161 16,161 16,161
Country-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Year-fixed effects No Yes No No No
Country-year-fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Month-fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Lagged dependent variable No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is Offshoreimy. Time period is 2000–2012. Panels B, C and D exclude coun-
tries classified as tax havens by Hines (2010), Johannesen and Zucman (2014) or any of the two studies,
respectively (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for country lists). Confiscationimy is a binary variable indi-
cating the beginning of a spell of months with news reports on expropriations and property confiscations
in country i; and Offshoreimy is a binary variable indicating the incorporation of at least one offshore
entity by agents from country i (see Section 3 for details). Standard errors are clustered at the country
level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
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